18-To Catch Bandits, Nab Their Ringleader First

To Catch Bandits, Nab Their Ringleader First

 To Catch the Bandits, First Catch Their Ringleader (RM)

Convince the leader and the rest will follow.

១៨. បំបែកសម្បុកចោរដោយចាប់មេចោរ

1. នៅក្នុងសុភាសិតចិនបានបង្ហាញថា បើសិនជាចង់សម្លាប់សត្វពស់ក្នុងការបាញ់តែមួយគ្រាប់ យើងត្រូវតែដឹងអំពីកន្លែងសំខាន់របស់វាឲ្យច្បាស់លាស់សិន។ ដើម្បីយកឈ្នះ យើងត្រូវតែប្រហារឲ្យចំចំណុច      កណ្តាលនៃបញ្ហា។ នៅពេលដែលយើងជួបបញ្ហា ហើយគ្រាន់តែដោះស្រាយអ្វីដែលជារោគសញ្ញានោះវាពិតជាឆ្ងាយពីចំណុចសំខាន់ ជាងការដែលជីកកកាយយករឹសវា។ នៅក្នុងយុទ្ធសាស្ត្រសង្គ្រាមឈូងសមុទ្រលើកទីមួយរបស់សហរដ្ឋអាមេរិច គឺត្រូវតែចាប់យកមេបញ្ចាការ និង ធ្វើការវាយប្រហារលើមជ្ឈមណ្ឌលទំនាក់ទំនងតាមរយៈផ្លូវអាកាស។ នៅក្នុងយុទ្ធសាស្ត្រមួយនេះ យើងត្រូវតែចាប់យកមេដឹកនាំសត្រូវដ៏ខ្លាំងមួយម្នាក់ ក្នុងគោលបំណងចាប់យកសត្រូវទាំងអស់។

กลยุทธ์ที่ 18 จับโจรเอาหัวโจก

กลยุทธ์จับโจรเอาหัวโจก หรือ ฉินเจ๋ยฉินหวาง (อังกฤษ: Defeat the enemy by capturing their chief; จีนตัวย่อ: 擒贼擒王; จีนตัวเต็ม: 擒賊擒王; พินอิน: Qín zéi qín wáng) เป็นกลยุทธ์ที่มีความหมายถึงการทำศึกสงคราม จักต้องบุกเข้าโจมตีศัตรูในจุดที่เป็นจุดยุทธศาสตร์ของกองทัพ เพื่อสลายกำลังของศัตรูให้แตกกระจาย ศัตรูที่มีแม่ทัพฝีมือดีในการทำศึกสงครามย่อมเป็นขวัญและกำลังใจของเหล่าทหาร การวางแผนใช้กลอุบายหลอกล่อเอาชนะแม่ทัพที่มีฝีมือในเชิงยุทธ์ที่เก่งกาจ จักให้ต้องกลอุบายที่สับสน หลอกล่อให้หลงทิศและขจัดไปเสียให้พ้น เสมือน "มังกรสู้บนปฐพี ก็อับจนหมดหนทาง" ซึ่งเปรียบประหนึ่งดุจมังกรในท้องทะเล อาจหาญขึ้นมาต่อสู้กับศัตรูบนผืนแผ่นดิน ก็ย่อมได้รับความปราชัยแก่ศัตรูได้โดยง่าย ตัวอย่างการนำเอากลยุทธ์จับโจรเอาหัวโจกไปใช้ได้แก่จูกัดเหลียงที่มีความกริ่งเกรงต่อสุมาอี้ในการทำศึกสงครามกับวุยก๊กจึงวางกลอุบายขจัดสุมาอี้ ซึ่งเมื่อปราศจากสุมาอี้แล้วจูกัดเหลียงก็ไม่เกรงกลัวต่อความยิ่งใหญ่ของกองทัพวุยก๊กอีกต่อไป

18. To catch rebels, bring down their leader first

Douglas MacArthur, a general not known for military brilliance, proved himself the man for the job in the occupation of post WWII Japan. MacArthur respected the Asian point of view and had studied it more than his other West Point peers. Though he had been something of a plodder on the battle fields of the Pacific, he distinguished himself in humanely and efficiently running an occupation that began with both conquerors and conquered highly antagonistic towards each other and misinformed.

Certainly, the Japanese had been portrayed as devils to American service men, and vice versa. For this problem, MacArthur ordered restraint and food. As GIs passed out food to a starving people, the Japanese lost their initial distrust of the American military; and the young American soldiers, seeing children who had gone hungry and giving them food, made them appreciate the humanity of their former enemies. And what prejudice could stand at the sight of children hungrily eating and remembering their manners long enough to say "Thank you" and bow with respect. The US occupation of Japan is remarkable for how thoroughly the transformation of attitude took place on both sides as enmity gave way to profound friendships and new understanding.

But there were nationalistic hold outs, and the threat of violence was never far away during the early days of the occupation. Japan's military tradition had been one of "Death or Victory," and there were leftover right-wing elements in Japan that were ready to riot.

MacArthur could not police an entire nation to that extent. If the old fervent patriotism took hold of the people again, catastrophe could ensue. So he arranged to have a public audience with Japan's emperor, a man reputed to be descended from the gods, and a man who had never been photographed for public view. When MacArthur met Hirohito, the American general wore his daily army uniform. He didn't even have a tie on. Hirohito dressed in fine Western clothes. MacArthur spoke politely but briefly with the emperor and then had their picture taken together. Japanese advisors urged against having the photograph published, but MacArthur over rode them. He ordered the picture published on the front page of the newspapers, and it appeared the very next day.

The Japanese people, who had never even been allowed to look directly at their divine ruler, saw a photograph of the laconic MacArthur, towering over the short and wilted looking Hirohito. This was their mighty emperor, a mere man dwarfed by the American General and unable to forbid the photograph.

Adroitly, MacArthur had provided perfect, unarguable proof that the emperor was merely a man, and not all that impressive of a man, even when he presented himself at his finest. The Japanese common man lost that reverential edge, and the hardcore nationalists found that the outcry to protect a divine emperor had lost a lot of its majestic ring.